IMT Nuremberg Archives

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International Court of Justice

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Cook
1400 - 1600
21 June 1946
Von Leeb

Translated.

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT FOR THE DEFENSE OF ORGANIZATIONS, TAKEN BEFORE A COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL DATED 13 MARCH 1946

FRIDAY, 21 JUNE 1946.

COMMISSIONERS:

Captain Joseph Tubridy.

THE OKW

(The Commission convened at 1400 hours)

RITTER VON LEEB, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:

BY CAPTAIN TUBRIDY:

Q Will the witness rise and raise his right hand and repeat after me:

I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

(The witness repeated the oath)

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: You may sit down.

DR. IATERNSER: I want to prove by this witness, General Field Marhsal Ritter Von ~~XXXX XXX~~ Leeb, that the military leaders did not form a group; secondly, that the military leaders did not participate in the planned conspiracy; thirdly, that they did not agree with the methods of the NSDAP; and fourthly, that they did not participate in any criminal action according to ARTICLE VI of the Statute.

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DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q Witness, when were you born?

A On the 5 September 1876

Q Your last rank was that of Field Marshal?

A Yes, Field Marshal.

Q And your last campaign or your last duty was what?

A Commander in Chief of an Army Group.

Q What were your activities before the War?

A I was used in connection with troop activities. I was in the General Staff. Then I was Commander in Chief of/~~xxxxx~~ Armored Division No. 7, from 1929 to 1933, and Commander in Chiefof Armored Division No. 2 from 1933 to 1938.

Q And you are at the present in the Court prison?

A Yes

Q As you probably know, the Prosecution has claimed and is attempting tp prove that the high military leaders formed a group, and that their goal was to start a world war and in this world war notto take advantage of the rights and regulations and rules of warfare. Did the high military leaders form such a group or organization?

A The high military leaders did not form a group nor organization and no club and no cooperative group and no conspiracy. We only were the ones who took charge of these various jobs at the time, the high leaders of the

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military. We did not volunteer into the duties of these jobs, but due to the orders of our superiors also we did not leave the military service voluntarily, but we were forced before the re-armament practically every two years. We did not have our own chart and no connections and no connections among each other and no duties or any other or any other cooperation or membership. We were only connected through individual duties and jobs. We did not form a war circle and did not make any mutual plans and we received our orders from our superiors which we carried out. It will be impossible or it would be unthinkable that the Commander in Chief of the Army would have permitted that the men in his command would have formed a sworn conspiracy. We could not form a group organization because of our number, and besides that those which the Prosecution named in top positions, there were until 1935 only two Commanders in Chief in the army, and that was Marhsll Von Rundstedt who has just been questioned, and myself, and in 1935, a third was added to that, Marhsll Von Bock, and in 1937 there was a fourth one added. We differentiated ourselves basically from the party organizations because we did not have a mutual political goal. We could not have that first, because we are not a group, and secondly, because of the laws of the Reich, and also because of tradition a German officer could not belong to any party. We were entirely outside of political

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politics. We did not serve any party and did not serve any system and no form of state, but we only served our land. That is about what I should say.

Q Did you agree to the re-armament?

A I considered re-armament as necessary because Germany was situated in the middle of Europe without any natural waters, but was surrounded by country who in opposition to our position under the Versailles Treaty had not demobilized and had re-armed, and in addition to that made requests of land, for instance, the area left of the Rhine.

Q Were you ever at any time of the opinion that the re-armament was for the purpose of war?

A In the Statement of the Prosecution or indictment that we Generals wanted a powerful army in Germany so that we could then carry out aggressive war, I consider the re-armament as the best means of security. Without re-armament of our seven divisions only a very limited opposition would have been possible. We would have been overrun.

Q Did you agree with the speed of the re-armament?

A I consideredthe speed as too fast. I considered it better and safer to re-arm on an slower basis.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY : Dr. Laternser, if it is possible, could we avoid having duplications of ~~the~~ testimony. The witness, Von Rundstedt, has already testified as to this matter.

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DR. IA TERNSER: Yes, I am very glad or would be only too glad to do this if I am assured that the statements made by General Von Rundstedt are considered as correct. If that is not the case I will have to enlarge or prove my evidence until I am through.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: Unfortunately, under the terms of the appointment of this Commission it was perscribed that there will not be any cumulative evidence taken, and if we have a repetition by this witness of prior testimony of the preceding witness, we would be violating the terms of the order.

DR. IA TERNSER: I will attempt to obey this order.

By DR: IA TERNSER:

Q On the 5 November 1937 Hitler called together the Chiefs of the various branches of the armed forces and in that meeting told them of his political and military goals. What was your position in 1937?

A Commander in Chief of the Army Group II.

Q In other words, at that time you were directly under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army?

A Yes.

Q And at that time, did the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Von Fritsch, did he tell you anything about that matter?

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A No

Q When did you hear of this matter for the first time?

A I heard it here.

Q Otherwise, were you in favor of the NSDAP and also of the political and diplomatic goals of the party?

A No.

Q Q Were you always informed of the aggressive intention of national socialism?

A No, at that time I believes his promised for a continued peace.

Q Were you as Commander in Chief II, did you participate in the publication of the military --

A No, I never directed the publication service.

Q As commander in Chief II of the entire western front, was the entire western front under your command?

A Yes

Q Did you hear anything or participate in the plan to occupy the Rhineland, and when did you hear about it?

A I did not participate in this. I was called to Berlin about one or two days before the occupation, the day this intention was told me. I was told at the same time not to give any orders and not to speak to any one concerning this, and in addition to that, if I remember correctly,

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only three batallions were sent across the Rhineland, one to xxxx Aachen, one to Trier and one to Saarbrucken. In other words, this occupation did not have any military significance, but I did it only describing it as a symbolic act.

Q Were you informed of the xxxx goals of national socialism in the East? I am thinking of the xx extermination of the Jews, xxxx Germans of the area, and the deportation of the population?

A Never.

Q You, before the war, were in positions in which you would have been informed of any mutual plans concerning aggressive wars. These positions you already mentioned before in answer to my questions. xxxxx Did you before the war, together with other Commanders in Chief, make any plans for aggressive wars?

A We are concerned here with the space of eight and a half years, 1929 to 1938. In these eight and a half years I did not participate in the planning of an aggressive war. Neither did I receive an order to plan such an aggressive war or to prepare one and I did not do that, for my own intention was just the opposite. As Commander in Bavaria I only gave in my operational travels and duties, I only gave defensive plans, and that is on the Bavaria-Czech border, and as Commander in Chief in Kassel I had the defense of the Rhine tactics and a counter attack against

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an enemy that had already come over the line, and later the defense of the Western border, and at that time the West wall was begun, sometime in 1935 or 1936, an occupation of about three weak armies was anticipated and this was for the defense of this west wall. Before the first world war we mostly practiced the attack and after the first world war the pendulum moved toward the other side. The defense, in all of its variations, was the main point. I myself wrote a book concerning defense. This book was taken over by the American Army, as the foundation book of the military classes, and an American officer told me it had also been translated into the Russian language. And if this is correct I do not know.

Q Were you - that is the statement of the Prosecution - did you plan or want to plan aggressive wars?

A No, that could be proved from the things I have already stated. ~~Besides~~ Besides that, the old Generals had participated in the first world war and we knew the horrors of the war and the terror it has brought to our families and ourselves. I read the Prosecution's statement or indictment about the horrors of war. ~~To~~ To/we older German Generals here, such worldly matters lost their shine

Q When did you leave the active service?

A In February 1938?

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Q What did you do during your r etirement then?

A I lived near Munich myself and carried out a study of the archives in the Bavarian State Archives and wrote a history of my family.

Q Did you participate in the March into Austria?

A No

Q And into the entry into the Sudetenland?

A Yes, I received in the summer of 1938 the order to find out the march of an army near the Border. It was purely a military order in case of attack either from Czecho Slovakia or France, and during the peaceful march I lead this army.

Q Did you participate in the occupation of Czecho - Slovakia.

A No.

Q What did you do after the occupation of the Sudeten-land?

A After having left for about three weeks I returned and continued my studies.

Q Did you have up to that time, that is, during the time of Munich, until February, 1938, or even maybe later on, were you at any time in the position to point out

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to Hitler the advantages of an aggressive war or any influence concerning any aggressive war?

A There was no such possibility. It should now be rather well known that Hitler decided his own foreign policy. He hardly let his foreign minister who was there for that reason, he hardly let him to it, much less the generals whom he mistrusted. I was not even asked for my ~~xxxxxxx~~ military advice.

Q The Prosecution has presented a sworn statement by Field Marshal Von Blomberg, USA Exhibit 536. I quote from this state:

"I, as well as the entire group of German Staff Officers, believed that these three questions, that is, the ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ question of the Polish Corridor, the question of the Ruhr area and the Memel area, under which the question of the Polish Corridor was especially important, that this had to be solved some day, if necessary through power of arms."

Was there actually such an opinion among the higher military leaders?

A I don't believe it. I know only the Western half of the Reich. I am positive that in my area, that is the Western part, the most of my staff officers believed that this question was to be solved in a diplomatic and peaceful way.

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Q Did Blomberg attempt a very close friendship with the officers under his command and did he attempt to act according to their suggestions?

A I believe that his information was not sufficiant for him to give such an opinion. In the four years I was Commander in Bavaria he was only there one time as far as I remember and during my four and a half years in the West he came three times, once to the flag commemoration, and once to a celebration someplace in Cologne and once to large manuevers, which I was in charge of.

Q What did you do in August of 1939. Were you at that time in the military service or were you retired?

A I was retired near Munich .

Q In what way did you hear of the plan of aggressive war against Poland?

A On the 22nd of October I suddenly was ordered to come to Obersalzberg, and that is where Hitler announced the Polish campaign.

DR. KEMPNER: Wasn't that in August, not October?

WITNESS: It was August.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q When did you receive the order to come to Obersalzberg?

A Probably the daybefore.

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Q Did you, after this meeting of the 22nd of August, have a possibility of a discussion after Hitler had informed you bf his plans?

A The speech of Hitler was not a discussion but the decision of the Chief of State. It was impossible to make any kind of a protest, but quietly the whole thing was just a play, quietly for myself I hoped it would go the same way as the march into the Sudetenland, everything was peaceful.

Q The Prosecution hasin it's possession many documents, concerning the speaking at Obersalsberg on the 22nd of August, and of these it presented two. Before the Tribunal one of these statements was read, according to which the Generals were supposed to have applauded wildly after this speech, and that is when Hitler finished stating his intention against Poland. Is that true?

A Each of the Generals that were there at the time were quiet. I myself was very influenced and worried by the fact that the foreign policy of Hitler had taken this step.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: What does he mean by "influenced"? Impressed?

DR. KEMPNER: Yes. He means "impressed."

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q Was the impression upon the other General Officers that were present the same as far as you could see?

A I believe it was the same.

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Q Did Hitler state anything about his intentions against the Western powers?

A I believe that I remember it almost word by word, because that concerned me. He stated that "I can assure you a hundred per-cent, almost a hundred per-cent, that the western powers will not enter the war."

Q Where were you during the Polish campaign?

A I was Commander in Chief of xxx Army Group C and was defending the Western frontier.

Q Was the western front occupied very strongly?

A No, it was occupied weakly.

Q The Prosecution, on the 4th of January, stated that after the Polish campaign, the German officers thought of nothing but a war to capture the entire European xxx Continent, and the Prosecution furthermore claims that the Generals approved of these intents of Hitler. Are these statements true?

A Just the opposite is true. My force in the West as I have already stated already was very weak. The West wall had not been completed and in the Eiffel area it was just beginning. The Western powers without a doubt knew of the weak west wall and of it's weak occupation, but anyhow they did not attack. They waited for the advantageous moment, either they were not ready yet, but that is not probable, or they did not want to attack, or not

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at that time anyhow for some reason. Maybe they did not want to take the task upon themselves, or maybe we were supposed to bang our heads bloody against the Maginot line. Concerning all of these thoughts I sent a very large memo to the Commander in Chief of the Army. I proposed not to have an attack in the West. I proposed that only so many divisions from the East be transferred to the West so that the west wall could be defended against any attack. I proposed then to deactivate all other divisions. I proposed the end that this measure would become known to the western powers, and in this way they were supposed to be informed that we did not intend to capture them and I had hoped that a diplomatic attempt would be successful to bring about a closer relationship or a betterment of the matter. I had the same notice due to the continuous movements of the date of attack. I did my best. In other words, I did not attempt to bring about an aggressive war against France but I attempted to prevent it. I am sorry but all of these hopes were only superficial. Hitler wrote during November various strong protests to the Commander in Chief concerning their weaknesses and told them of his distrust.

Q What was your position during the Russian campaign?

A I was Commander in Chief of the Army Group North.

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Q What was your participation in the preparation of this attack?

A In the course of this work, I believe it was about in March, we were called to Hitler and there informed of the following in long statements:

"The idea is that Russia will attack us very certainly and we have, in order for security, to go ahead of this attack."

In other words, a preventive war has to be. I still don't know today whether these statements by Hitler at the time were true or were lies.

Q Did you after marching into Russia find out there were small forces there?

A At my point there was a strong power of forces.

Q Did you see a lot of new air ports?

A I cannot say that specifically.

Q Did you not speak later on to a Russian army chief concerning this march?

A A higher Russian officer told me, he claimed he was Commander in Chief of an Army, told me that before my sector four large armies were supposed to be, and of those, that all were there at the time with the exception of one Siberian army which was still in transport. These statements proved only what I had already seen from my actual contact.

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Q Did you before the start of the Russian campaign have any possibility or any chance to show them or hamper the idea or order of Hitler to attack Russia?

A There was no possibility to hamper the orders of Hitler. It was impossible to point out the difficulty of an xxxx attack xxx campaign in the wide spaces of Russia. It was impossible tp,point out the dangers of a two-front war. Exactly, that for the German National Socialist State was the biggest fault of the Kaiser Reich or the Kaiser that we should not have a two front war started.

Q When did you leave the active service again after this?

A January, 1942.

Q Were you retired?

A No, I asked for my retirement.

Q And why?

A Because of tthe development which the National Socialist System took, first in a political manner, the prosecution of the churches, secondly, and the foreign political policy, thirdly, and for personal reasons, because I myself and my wife were being watched and guarded and spied on, and, fourthly, for international right in preventing a situation because of the commissar, and, fifth, one of the main points was the continuous false orders or decisions, which, without any reason, xxxxxxx caused

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a lot of bloodshed which was avoidable. I saw no further possibility to influence the autocratic decisions of Hitler and the operations of Hitler and that is why I resigned.

Q Was there at that time already a law according to which military leaders were unable if they did not agree to military orders or for some other reason wished to leave the service?

A So far as I know, no. However, the agreement of Hitler was necessary, becauseotherwise it would have been desertion or a breaking of the oath unless Hitler agreed.

Q In other words, against the will of Hitler you could not have done that?

A Hardly.

Q What did you do after you were released?

A After retirement I returned to Munich and continued my study of the Archives and finished the history of my family. I was completely in the background. That took three and a half years and then there was the rest of it.

Q When did you move and by whom were you moved?

A By American soldiers. After my arrest my xxxx personal memoirs were burned and plundered and destroyed and I am sorry but among them were many valuable documents

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which had been given to me for safekeeping by the Bavarian archives.

Q The prosecution claims that the military leaders had planned concerning certain crimes of war. Is that true?

A We did not have any mutual plan. Our entire education was training and tradition, and besides that we ~~taught the rules of warfare~~ guarded well most of these rules of warfare and we asked the same things from our soldiers, the honor of the enemy and the honor of proclamation honoring the rules of warfare.

Q Did you as a Commander in Chief of an army group have the power of a court?

A No.

Q Was this power with the armies?

A With the armies and with the lower positions.

Q Could you find out how these courts were handled by the armies under your command?

A I could ask that a transcipt of the report be given to me but I believe that I got a much better indication of discipline by the front troops, by regular, frequent front inspections, and you would get a much better impression through them than through single acts or files.

Q When would you say for the first time that Hitler did not respect the international rules of war?

A That was in an already mentioned speech in the

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spring of 1941. At that time he said that the right warfare was not the right thing for the Russian campaign and that the political commisars were not considered soldiery.

Q What did you do thereupon?

A I, with various other generals, went to the Commander in Chief of the Army and protested against this. The Commander in Chief of the Army made assuring statements.

Q After that an order was issued that the commissars are to be shot and a second order was attached to it according to which soldiers were not supposed to be disciplined in crimes against the population. What did you do now?

A One further order came out at the same time and that is when the Commanders in Chief of the Army ~~xxxxx~~ required the sharpest discipline, and that left the importance or destroyed the impor tance of the other two orders. We understood what the Commander in Chief wanted through his order. I myself, that is, the army group command post, only received this order later, since this army group headquarters, as stated already, did not have any courts.

Q Did you agree with the army directive?

A At that time I had the 50th Army Corps and that corps did not receive the decree. I stated time and time again that I considered that decree ~~xx~~ unlawful.

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Q Did you through your front inspections - could you see whether the lower commanders were of xxx the same opinion?

A I noticed that very often. At that time about eight or nine commanding generals were under my command. Of these generals I met four here in prison, in various xxx prisons, that is. I asked the opinion at various times concerning this decree and these four commanding generals told me the following, either they did not receive the decree at all, or they did not pass it on, or they saw to it that it was not carried out. Besides, the fact was that the troops did not take the time mostly to find the political commissars and had quite often taken their own men, and, therefore, this decree, without much noise about it, was quietly sabotaged.

Q Who are the Commanding Generals that you met while in prison? Who are these generals who stated that they either did not receive the order or did not pass it on or passed it on to the individual commanders with the order not to carry it out? xxxx

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Q Do you know these accused Commanders in Chief who were of the same opinion concerning this order as you?

A Yes, I believe I know them all. I know at least that those/were in my scope of orders, they were of the same opinion.

Q Did the 18th army belong to your area?

A Yes.

Q And who was your commanding general there?

A Colonel General Von Kueckler.

Q Did you ever discuss the commissar order with him?

A I cannot say that under oath whether or not I did that, but it is possible.

Q Did you consider the commissar order advantageous to war fare?

A I considered this decree as a big mistake because it brought the shaprest resistance from the political commissars and these forces brought their troops to the highest resistance and the greatest resistance. One should have donethe opposite. We should have burned our own bridges to the political commissars.

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Q Why did the Commanders in Chief not mutually get together and ask that these orders be rescinded?

A We were not a group, first of all. Secondly, I am afraid that Hitler would have considered us as mutineers, but at least not able to carry out this war against Russia. Maybe the situation would have been favorable to remove all unwanted Commanders in Chief and resort to replacement through irresponsible men. Then the opposite would have happened from what we wanted. The order probably would not have been rescinded, and it probably would have been made more powerful. The only possible way out of this difficult situation was to quietly sabotage it, and that is what happened.

Q Was the order rescinded later on, do you know?

A That was after my time.

Q Do you know anything concerning the Einsatzgruppe A in the area of the army group North?

A I never did hear of any task of Einsatzgruppe A which were against the Reich rules of war.

Q The Prosecution has presented a sworn document of SS Fuehrer Schellenberg, USA 557, in which Schellenberg states the following, I quote:

I want to quote the entire thing so that the entire thing can be translated.

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CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: How long is it?

INTERPRETER: About eight lines.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: Go ahead.

BY DR. IATERNSER:

Q "The aforementioned close cooperation or rather the first weeks of the Russian campaign, the close work between the field army and the Einsatzgruppe makes me express my opinion that the Commanding Chiefs of the army groups and of the armies which were ~~xxxxxxx~~ opposed to participation in the Russian campaign, already now changes the beginning of this compaign, and the large future duties of the Einsatzgruppe and Einstazgruppen Commanders and the Security Police and the SD, up to the mass extermination of the Jews collapsed, and all other resistance elements through the regular channels of the Commander in Chief of the army, that they were informed of this."

Witness were you informed of these goals and intentions before the beginning of the campaign?

A No

(A short recess is taken)

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(THE COMMISSION RECONVENED AT 1545 HOURS.)

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q I refer to the ~~same~~ same affidavit referred to the in the previous question in this, my next question. In this Document, it says that in the beginning of June, 1943 a conference took place between Schellenberg and the chief operations officer of the army, together with Wagner, Heydrick and Kanaris in the presence of all the 1-C officers of all the army and army groups concerning the Einsatzkommandos. In this connection, Schellenberg makes the following claim, which I quote: "In any case, one can hardly doubt that these 1-C officers has informed all their Commanders-in-Chief of all army and army groups who had returned after the action against Russia." I should like to ask you if your 1-C officer reported to you or informed you of such information?

A I don't remember the slightest thing about this.

Q While you were in the east did you ever receive a report, according to which Lithuanians were supposed to have carried out a massacre on the Jewish population of Kovno?

A ~~XXXXXXXXX~~ I received the affidavit of an officer of my staff and this General stated under oath. An officer of my staff went to Kovno and there he learned of a terrible massacre carried on ~~XX~~ the Jewish population at Kovno. He reported this matter to me and thereupon I issued the strictest instructions that these measures against the Jews in Kovno by the Lithuanians was to cease immediately. That is what this General states under oath. Then, we later ourselves advanced on Kovno. He convinced himself that the city commandant carried out the orders in the strictest terms. The remarkable thing concerning this affidavit is that Lithuanians are the ones who carried out this Jewish persecution. That is to say the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Einsatzgruppe

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did not appear.

Q I shall submit this affidavit later.

The witness, Uhlendorff, who has been interrogated here said that Hitler or Himmler spoke to all the commanders in chiefs before the Russian campaign about the persecution of the Jews, did you take part in any such conference or were you present at any such address or lecture?

A Witness Uhlendorff is just as much mistaken as Wittness Schellenberg. We were not so informed.

Q At which time did the Baltic countries come under the jurisdiction of the German Commandant east?

A As far as I know, by the decree proclaimed by Hitler on 17 June, 1941.

Q The prosecution has maintained that the German troops destroyed over 2,000 chapels and churches in Russia. Could you make such an observation while you were on Soviet-Russian territory?

A I did not see any churches which were destroyed. On the other hand, I also saw no church which served its original purpose.

Q I should now like to ask you some questions concerning Leningrad. You proposed to Keitel on one of his visits to you that the Russian population should be transferred to Russian territory by means of a corridor that should be established south of Schlusselburg. In what relation did your suggestion to Keitel stand?

A The position was the following: Leningrad had been encircled in the north by the Finns and in the south by my troops. There was only a connection to the inner part of Russia left across the Ladoga sea. A reconnaissance showed that shipping on the Ingermannland lake was not

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sufficient to supply Leningrad. The intelligence received from agents concerning the food situation in Leningrad was contradictory. This information varied between several weeks and several months, therefore, I was afraid that one day food would be so scarce in Leningrad that the population would leave the city in entire groups. Because of this fear, I proposed to negotiate with the Russians and to get them to agree that the population of Leningrad should be transferred to the Russian territory in an orderly fashion.

Q Then your concern was so that the population of Leningrad should not starve, is that it?

A At that time, we estimated Leningrad to have a population of from one and one quarter to one and one half million people and the supply condition on our side for this more than a million population was the following: I could have housed and fed a few hundred or thousands of the population of Leningrad in Ingermannland which is west of Leningrad and in Esthonia. We did not take any food supplies away from the population and it may have been possible to have the population tied over as far as food was concerned until the next harvest. South of Leningrad there is an immence girdle of forest and swamp. No essential number of people could be housed there. That means the mass of the population would have fallen into my lot to feed and that was impossible. The supply system was so tense at that time that I had difficult at that time in supplying my own troops and it was not possible to supply an additional million of the population of Leningrad. It was also not possible to remove them by train for the conditions as far as transportation were concerned was such that we were just able to meet our own requirements. For these reasons, I made the proposal that has been mentioned.

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Q Were any agreements reached with the Russians?

A No such agreements were arrived at because the population did not begin to leave the city and the situation had not become a pressing one as yet. Because of the combat positions an agreement probably could not be reached as just where we wanted to have the population evacuated heavy battles were going on at the lower Wolchov and in the direction of Tuglin. Then the river froze over and the Russians built a railway across at a tremendous and surprise speed. I cannot say, under oath, whether a second Railroad line was built or not. This is how I remember it and for another thing the population did not leave Leningrad at least not in large numbers at any rate. In this way, the entire affair receded in the background. I was then able to assume that sufficent supplies were still at hand or had been brought up. I left the section in January of 1942.

Q I have a few more questions concerning the shelling of Leningrad by artillery fire. Do you know what objectives were shelled by the German artillery stationed before Leningrad?

A First of all, I should like to say that at the time I was in command no shelling of Leningrad took place in the sense of an artillery bombardment. Insofar as our munitions were concerned, the situation was very tense, therefore, only the most necessary objectives could be shot at or shelled in the Leningrad sector. I needed my heavy munitions in the battle area of Denianzand Wolchov. The objectives which we shelled were military objectives and I would like to name the tank works at Pierow which manufactured the heavy Russian tanks - the tanks that were produced left the works and fired at our ranks and this organization was one of the objectives which we shelled.

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We shelled the steel works Ischavosky. I assumed that munitions were being manufactured there. We shelld the dock and harbor installations and the Leningrad Harbor at the mouth of the Neva where it closed into the Finnish Bay. Evidently submarines were being built there. We shelled the iron works at Marva as they shot at our lines with heavy ship artillery.

Q A witness has been interrogated here who believed he was in a position to testify that the castles in and around Leningrad were shelled on purpose.

A Of course, my testimony can only confine itself up to January, 1942. I consider it impossible at this time that castles were systematically shelled as we lacked artillery and munitions for this.

Q Did you find during your advance on Soviet Russian territory that Russian troops carried out great devastations in Russian territory?

A The Russian troops knew how to destroy their railroad lines very skillfully. I don't believe that any railroad station of any importance fell into our hands undestroyed. One thing that caused us very much trouble was the destruction of water supply stations for locomotives. Much time had to be spent in order to put the railway lines in a half way decent condition. Again, the rails too had to be changed from the larger Russian gauge to the smaller German gauge. Numerous street bridges had also been destroyed. The result was that I had to postpone my advance between the Ilmen Lake and Lake Peipus another eight or ten days. I had to stop and wait until the lines had been repaired.

Q No further questions.

H0974 - 0030

Com. A.
Take 4-Pg. 6.
Meehan
21 July
Van Leeb.

CROSS EXAMINATION.

BY DR. KEMPNER:

Q Did you receive your officer's training at the German War Academy?

A Yes.

Q When did you receive your training with theGeneral Staff in Berlin?

A From 1909 to 1911.

Q Did you keep up your contact with other comrades of the General Staff or did you have no touch with them later on?

A In 1911 I returned to Bavaria.

Q Were you a member later of the Schlieffen organization?

A I believe every general staff officer had to be a member of this organization.

Q Did you receive the material and pamphlets of this organization?

A I received the lists of members and statements of accounts, etc.

Q This organization was a very respected one, was it not?

A I believe so.

Q And had a very good name, as the best officers' organization?

A I believe this statement can be answered in the affirmative.

Q The majority of these gentlemen received higher positions later on - that is to say they turned out to be something, is that correct?

A To a certain extent that is undoubtedly correct for the best people were accepted in the general staff.

Q Would it be correct to say that these gentlemen realy understood the military theory?

A The training that was received there was a general staff technical

H0974-0031

staff training. For instance, how to cope with railroad transports, etc., large troop movements and how to lead a battle.

Q Strategy?

A Yes.

Q Operational Training and Tactics?

A Yes

Q Military law and history of war?

A Yes, as far as ~~marshall~~ martial law is concerned. I am not quite sure about the Prussian staff, although in Bavaria, yes.

Q Did you receive the order?

A Yes.

Q Did you know what Moltke and Schlieffen say about the order? They said: "Higher than the order is my conscience and my duty to my fatherland."

A I don't remember this passage, but it is probably so.

Q Do you agree with this statement because you retired in 1942?

A I gave proof of this by my own person.

Q From which year onward were you suppicious of Hitler, the ~~thing~~ affair of Hitler and his party?

A I must say here that my time was so taken up with military things, I could not take my time up with political matters and also we were not allowed to do so, however, at any rate one had ones thoughts about these things. If you would like to know the date of the year, I would say that beginning with the year of 1933 I began to mistrust them or at least I began to take a waiting position as to what they would do. I do not know for certain, but I would say in 1933.

H0974-0032

Q Where were you in 1933?

A I was Chief of Service Command 2 in Stettin.

Q Did you interest yourself in the Hitler Putsche in Munich.

A As the army chief for Bavaria, of course it would be of interest to me.

Q Do you know that Hitler broke his word of honor at that time toward the Generals Losser and Kahr?

A That is the presentation that is given that he broke his word.

Q Did you have your suspicions of the whole affair already at that time and did your suspicions increase up to 1933?

A I did not like the bragging attitude from the very beginning.

Q Where were you in 1933 when Hitler came to power?

A I was commander in Bavaria?

Q Did you live in Munich?

A Yes.

Q Is it correct that you were in Munich in February and March of 1933?

A

Q Do you remember the large election posters that had been put up in Munich, "Hitler Means War!"

A No. You mean they must have been posted by the opposing party.

Q Yes, by the Bavarian people's party and the Social Democratic party. Do you remember the phrase brought up by the people at that time? "Hitler Means War - He Who XXXXX Elects Hitler Votes For War."

H0974-0033

A I cannot testify under oath that I remember these things.

Q You rejected Hitler's theories,is that correct?

A No, it is not correct as you state it. I knew the main points of his program and if one reads these points quite carefully, there are many points that one might agree with, but a large part of these points of his program were reversed into the opposite.

Q Did you approve of his racial theory?

A That was one of the big foolish things that were done.

Q What about the Lebensraum or living space theory?

A What do you mean?

Q Germany did not have sufficient living space?

A That was a political slogan.

Q Germany must have territory in the east in order to live?

A I had no possibility of judging if this was right or wrong. I considered this one of the many political slogans.

Q Was it your personal opinion that Germany had sufficient living space?

A We had been able to live since the existance of the Reich since 1871 until 1933. I suppose that it was also possible for the future.

Q You answered to one of Dr. Laterner's questions that you had hoped that the Polish campaign would also be carried out without any bloodshed the same as the Sudetenland campaign.

A A silent hope.

Q Would it be correct to say that you meant that you had hoped that Hitler would have a certain success with this Polish campaign, but

Van Leeb.

that it would be carried out without bloodshed.

A I hoped that without any bloodshed and without any warfare the affair might lead to a diplomatic and agreeable agreement.

Q But, on August 22nd Hitler did not mention anything of an agreement to you, did he?

A No, I don't believe so.

Q He said that more or less Poland would have to disappear.

A I don't remember in detail his statements. He said very much. I don't know whether you ever heard Hitler speak, he always bragged very much and one should not always take him very seriously.

Q Do you mean to say that you do not think he meant to have Poland disappear?

A No. On the contrary I just testified that he hoped and wished a peaceful settlement would be brought about.

Q In the same manner as the snake eats the rabbit. Is that the idea?

A No, that was not my idea, but a peaceful agreement similar to what happened at Munich before the march of Hitler into the Sudetenland - that the diplomats would come together and confer.

Q There the Sudetenland also disappeared?

A With the agreement of the western powers.

Q And by blackmail.

A I don't know, I did not take part in these meetings.

Q Did Hitler not say on August 22nd that conflict with Poland would happen sooner or later?

A I really don't remember what he said in detail.

H0974-0035

Q A number of gentlemen were assembled, is that true?

A Yes.

Q How many of your old comrades were present?

A What do you mean by old comrades?

Q The gentlemen of the leadership group whom you had known for many years?

A The Commanders in Chief? I probably knew all of them - some of them a long time and some for a shorter time.

Q Will you please mention the names of those whom you remember?

A Those who were present?

Q Yes.

A I don't remember the individual ones. I can mention allthe names as I remember, or the offices that had been assembled. Von Rundstedt, Witzleben, Boch, Reicheman and List. I must say that I am under oath and I do not remember if Commander in Chief 4 was Reicheman at that time, but I believe he was. You must remember that I had retired at that time and was no longer interested in the military affairs. I did quite different things at that time.

Q I should like to ask an intermediate question at this time. If you had no more interest in these things at that time and you were then already 62 years of age, why did you put your services at the disposal of an adventurer against whom you had certain convictions?

A Are you speaking from the viewpoint of the present time? At that time it was not quite so evident that Hitler was an adventurer. Moreover if the call comes to me and asks me to place my services at the disposal of my country in hard times and I still feel healthy, I considered

H0974 - 0036

it my duty not to ~~leave~~ let my country down. The motives may have been a personal ambition or so on.

Q But, you are a man with critical powers of observation and knew that your country was not in danger?

A I was not able to judge.

Q You knew that Poland was in danger of being swallowed by this snake?

A I already testified that I hoped for a peaceful settlement.

Q Did you know of Hitler's racial theories?

A I probably read of them in the newspaper. If it was reported in the newspaper, I must have known of it.

Q You considered it your duty to participate in 1939 for reasons?

A Yes.

Q I would like to advance a few years. Now there was another such strange meeting and this meeting took place before the so-called Russian campaign. Do you know that the prosecution submitted a Document of the General Staff. I shall quote the PS NO. a little later. This reads as follows: Dated - Spring, 1941. "We have to attack Russia, otherwise we will not be able to stand another winter of war. We must conquer these additional territories because we will have to feed Germany from these newly conquered territories."

Assuming that is correct, would you say today that the Russian war was a preventive war?

A What you just mentioned does not mean the reason or motive for a preventive war. The prevent/ive war is based on the statement of Hitler, saying that Russia was going to attack us in any case.

Q What gentlemen were asked to appear in the Reichs Cancellory in

H0974-0037

Berlin at that time to report on the Barbarossa Plan?

A The Barbarossa Plan refers to the Russian campaign. I assume the commanders in chiefs also the commanders of the Armies.

Q Would you say VonRundstedt was there?

A Yes.

Q Was Von Reichlman present?

A Yes. I can mention: Myself, Kuchlen; of No. 4 Hopne, who was hanged and Bush of the 16th. I must add that I believe they were present as I repeat I am under oath.

Q Yes, we are quite agreed to the fact that everything here is according to your knowledge and conscience. If you do not remember you cannot say.

A Yes.

Q At that time you reported to Hitler and told him how you thought the operation in the north was going to be carried out?

A I believe this report did not take place until the June meeting. There was another meeting at that time. If I remember correctly, the army group commands had to report separately. I did not learn what the other army groups had reported.

Q Then there was the meeting where the orders were issued, that was at the end of March. As I picture things, it was quite an enormous affair, was it not?

A Yes.

Q Was it not like a concert where every one had to be tuned to everyone else?

A Yes.

H0974-0038

Q At that time mention was made of the enormous cog wheel organization of the military machine where everything had to pump over from everything else?

A That does not only apply to this war, but to any war.

Q But, it was particularly evident here as there was such an enormous undertaking?

A I don't remember if more divisions were used than in the attack on the west.

Q Now, to return to the meeting. You stated as to how your operation was to be carried out, that is correct?

A Yes.

Q Do you remember his reaction to this?

A I don't think he objected or disapproved of anything. As far as I remember, he approved.

Q And did not interfere?

A No, at that time, thank God, not yet.

Q Why, thank God?

A It became worse from week to week. I can speak quite open here, can't I? During the entire campaign against France where I commanded one of the three army groups, I was not interferred with by one word. I issued orders to an armored army. In the Russian campaign, the same was true in the beginning that is in the first few weeks there was no interference. There was no interference during the operations in the Baltic countries and then for the reasons stated previously, there was a stop because of the destruction of the railway lines and the difficulty of getting supplies.

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That was when it began.

Q Hitler interferred with the people who were capable is that correct?

A I shall not say it of myself that I was capable, but the other gentlemen were. Yes, he interferred with them and Yodl during his interrogations once spoke of a martyrdom. Of course, I don't know if this is justifiable or not, but it was made very difficult.

Q It was very hard because this man interferred with you, was it not?

A He sometimes concerned himself with details which we ourselves did not know about and we had to inform ourselves first.

Q If action had been taken according to you gentlemen, the Generals of the General Staff and not according to Hitler, would it be correct to say the war would not have been lost.

A war in Russia is tremendously difficult. Hitler did not realize just where the difficulties lay and if he had followed us, the war would have ended at least in a draw or undecided.

Q In the west, if the Generals would have been able to do what they considered correct, it might have been won?

A I cannot judge this, because after I ~~returned~~ retired, I only learned what had taken place from the communications of the army.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: There will be a session tomorrow morning at teno'clock. We will adjourn until then.

(THE COMMISSION ~~RECESSED~~ ADJOURNED AT 1700 HOURS.)

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The foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the testimony of RITTER VON LEEB, taken on 21 June 1946.

Rose W Cook
Reporter (pp 1 – 23

Alice Mahon
Reporter (pp 24 – 38

CERTIFIED TO :

Joseph F Tubridy
Commissioner

H0974 -0041

Official transcript for the defense of organizations, taken before a Commission appointed by the International Military Tribunal pursuant to Paragraph 4 of the order of the Tribunal dated 13 March 1946.

FRIDAY, 21 JUNE 1946

COMMISSIONERS:

Captain Joseph Tubridy

THE CKW

(The Commission convened at 1400 hours)

RITTER VON LEEB, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:

BY CAPTAIN TUBRIDY:

Q Will the witness rise and raise his right hand and repeat after me:

I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

(The witness repeated the oath)

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: You may sit down.

DR. LATERNSER: I want to prove by this witness, General Field Marshal Ritter Von Leeb, that the military leaders did not form a group; secondly, that the military leaders did not participate in the planned conspiracy; thirdly, that they did not agree with the methods of the NSDAP; and fourthly, that they did not participate in any criminal action according to ARTICLE VI of the Statute.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q Witness, when were you born?

A On the 5th of September 1876.

Q Your last rank was that of Field Marshal?

A Yes, Field Marshal.

Q And your last campaign or your last duty was what?

A Commander in Chief of an Army Group.

Q What were your activities before the War?

A I was used in connection with troop activities. I was in the General Staff. Then I was Commander in Chief of Armored Division No. 7, from 1929 to 1933, and Commander in Chief of Armored Division No 2 from 1933 to 1938.

H0974-0042

Q And you are at present in the Court prison?

A Yes.

Q As you probably know, the Prosecution has claimed and is attempting to prove that the high military leaders formed a group, and that their goal was to start a world war and in this world war not to take advantage of the rights and regulations and rules of warfare. Did the high military leaders form such a group or organizations?

A The high military leaders did not form a group nor organization and no club and no cooperative group and no conspiracy. We only were the ones who took charge of these various jobs at the time, the high leaders of the military. We did not volunteer into the duties of these jobs, but due to the orders of our superiors also we did not leave the military service voluntarily, but we were forced before the re-armament practically every two years. We did not have our own chart and no connections and no connections among each other and no duties or any other cooperation or membership. We were only connected through individual duties and jobs. We didnot form a war circle and did not make any mutual plans and we received our orders from our superiors which we carried out. It willbe impossible or it would be unthinkable that the Commander in Chief of theArmy would have permitted that the men in his command would have formed a sworn conspiracy. We could not form a group organization because of our number, and besides that those which the Prosecution named in top positions, there were until 1935 only two Commanders in Chief in the Army, and that was Marshal Von Rundstedt who has just been questioned, and myself, and in 1935 a third was added to that, Marshal von Bock, and in 1937 there was a fourth one added. We differentiated ourselves basically from the party organizations because we did not have a mutual political goal. We could not have that first, because we are not a group, and secondly, because of the laws of the Reich and also because of tradition a German officer could not belong to any party. We were entirely outside of politics. We did not serve any party and did not serve any system and no form of state, but we only served our land. That is about what I should say.

Q Did you agree to the re-armament?

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A I considered re-armament as necessary because Germany was situated in the middle of Europe without any natural waters, but was surrounded by country who inopposition to our position under theVersailles Treaty had not demobilized and had re-armed, and in addition to that made requests of land, for instance , the area left of the Rhine.

Q Were you ever at any time of the opinion that the re-armament was for the purpose of war?

A In the Statement of the Prosecution or indictment that we Generals wanted a powerful army in Germany so that we could then carry out aggressive war, I consider the re-armament as the best means of security. Without re-armament of our seven divisions only a very limited opposition would have been possible. We would have been overrun.

Q Did you agree with the speed of the re-armament?

A I considered the speed too fast. I considered it better and safer to re-arm on the slower basis.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: Dr. Laternser, if it is possible, could we avoid having duplication of testimony. The witness, Von Rundstedt, has already testified as to this matter.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I am very glad or would be only too glad to do this if I am assured that the statements made by General Von Rundstedt are considered as correct. If that is not the case I will have to enlarge or prove my evidence until I am through.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: Unfortunately, under the terms of the appointment of this Commission it was prescribed that there will not be any cumulative evidence taken, and if we have a repitition by this witness of prior testimony of the preceding witness, we would be violating the terms of the order.

DR. LATERNSER: I will attempt to obey this order.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q On the 5 November 1937 Hitler called together the Chiefs of the various branches of the armed forces and in that meeting told them of his political and military goals. What was your position in 1937?

A Commander in Chief of the Army Group II.

Q In other words, at that time you were directly under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army?

A Yes.

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Q And at that time, did theCommander in Chief of the Army, General von Fritsch, did he tell you anything about that matter?

A No.

Q When did you hear of this matter for the first time?

A I heard it here.

Q Otherwise, were you in favor of the NSDAP and also of the political and diplomatic goals of the party?

A No.

Q Were you always informed of the aggressive intention of national socialism?

A No, at that time I believed his promise for a continued peace.

Q Were you as Commander in Chief II, did you participate in the publication of the military --

A No, I never directed the publication service.

Q As Commander in Chief II of the entire western front, was the entire western front under your command?

A Yes.

Q Did you hear anything or participate in the plan to occupy the Rhineland, and when did you hear about it?

A I did not participate in this. I was called to Berlin about one or two days before the occupation, the day this intention was told me. I was told at the same time not to give any orders and not to speak to any one concerning this, and in addition to that, if I remember correctly, only three batallions were sent across the Rhineland, one to Aachen, one to Trier and one to Saarbrucken. In other words, this occupation did not have any military significance, but I did it only describing it as a symbolic act.

Q Were you informed of the goals of national socialism in the East? I am thinking of the extermination of the Jews, Germans of the area, and the deportation of the population?

A Never.

Q You, before the war, were in positions in which you would have been infomred of any mutual plans concerning aggressive wars. These positions you already mentioned before in answer to my questions. Did you

H0974-0045

before the war, together with other Commanders in Chief, make any plans for aggressive war?

A We are concerned here with the space of eight and a half years 1929 to 1938. In these eight and a half years I did not participate in the planning of an aggressive war. Neither did I receive an order to plan such an aggressive war or to prepare one and I did not do that, for my own intention was just the opposite. As Commander in Bavaria I only gave in my operational travels and duties, I only gave defensive plans, and that is on the Bavaria-Czech border, and as Commander in Chief in Kassel I had the defense of the Rhine tactics and a counter attack against

H0974 - 0046

an enemy that had already come over the line, and later the defense of the Western border, and at that time the West wall was begun, sometime in 1935 or 1936, an occupation of about three weak armies was anticipated and this was for the defense of this west wall. Before the first world war we mostly practised the attack and after the first world war the pendulum moved toward the other side. The defense, in all of its variations, was the main point. I myself wrote a book concerning defense. This book was taken over by the American Army, as the foundation book of the military classes, and an American officer told me it had also been translated into the Russian language. And if this is correct I do not know.

Q Were you -- that is the statement of the Prosecution -- did you plan or want to plan aggressive wars?

A No, that could be proved from the things I have already stated. Besides that, the old Generals had participated in the first world war and we knew the horrors of the war and the terror it has brought to our families and ourselves. I read the Prosecution's statement or indictment about the horrors of war. To we older German Generals here, such wordly matters lost their shine.

Q When did you leave the active service?

A In February 1938.

Q What did you do during your retirement then?

A I lived near Munich myself and carried out a study of the archives in the Bavarian State Archives and wrote a history of my family.

Q Did you participate in the March into Austria?

A No.

Q And into the entry into the Sudetenland?

A Yes, I received in the summer of 1938 the order to find out the march of an army near the border. It was purely a military order in case of attack either from Czechoslovakia or France, and during the peaceful march I lead this army.

Q Did you participate in the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

A No.

Q What did you do after the occupation of the Sudetenland?

A After having left for about three weeks I returned and continued

H0974-0047

my studies.

Q Did you have up to that time, that is, during the time of Munich, until February 1938, or even maybe later on, were you at any time in the position to point out to Hitler the advantages of an aggressive war or any influence concerning any aggressive war?

A There was no such possibility. It should now be rather well known that Hitler decided his own foreign policy. He hardly let his foreign minister who was there for that reason, he hardly let him to it, much less the generals whom he mistrusted. I was not even asked for my military advice.

Q The Prosecution has presented a sworn statement by Field Marshal von Blomberg, USA Exhibit 536. I quote from this statement:

"I, as well as the entire group of German Staff Officers, believed that these three questions, that is, the question of the Polish Corridor, the question of the Ruhr area and the Memel area, under which the question of the Polish Corridor was especially important, that this had to be solved some day, if necessary through power of arms."

Was there actually such an opinion among the higher military leaders?

A I don't believe it. I know only the Western half of the Reich. I am positive that in my area, that is the Western part, the most of my staff officers believed that this question was to be solved in a diplomatic and peaceful way.

Q Did Blomberg attempt a very close friendship with the officers under his command and did he attempt to act according to their suggestions?

A I believe that his information was not sufficient for him to give such an opinion. In the four years I was Commander in Bavaria he was only there one time as far as I remember, and during my four and a half years in the West he came three times, once to the flag commemoration, and once to a celebration some place in Cologne and once to large maneuvers, that I was in charge of.

Q What did you do in August of 1939? Were you at that time in the military service or were you retired?

A I was retired near Munich.

Q In what way did you hear of the plan of aggressive war against Poland?

H0974-0048

A On the 22nd of October I was suddenly ordered to come to Obersalzberg and that is where Hitler announced the Polish campaign.

DR. KEMPNER: Wasn't that in August, not October?

WITNESS: It was August.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q When did you receive the order to come to Obersalzberg?

A Probably the day before.

H0974 – 0049

Q Did you, after this meeting of the 22nd of August, have a possibility of a discussion after Hitler had informed you of his plans?

A The speech of Hitler was not a discussion but the decision of the Chief of State. It was impossible to make any kind of a protest, but quietly the whole thing was just a play, quietly for myself I hoped it would go the same way as the march into the Sudetenland, everything was peaceful.

Q The Prosecution has in its possession many documents, concerning the speaking at Obersalzberg on the 22nd of August, and of these it presented two. Before the Tribunal one of these statements was read, according to which the Generals were supposed to have applauded wildly after this speech, and that is when Hitler finished stating his intention against Poland. Is that true?

A Each of the Generals that were there at the time were quiet. I myself was very influenced and worried by the fact that the foreign policy of Hitler had taken this step.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: What does he mean by "influenced"? Impressed?

DR. KEMPNER: He means "impressed".

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q Was the impression upon the other General Officers that were present the same as far as you could see?

A I believe it was the same.

Q Did Hitler state anything about his intentions against the Western powers?

A I believe that I remember it almost word by word, because that concerned me. He stated that "I can assure you a hundred percent, almost a hundred percent, that the western powers willnot enter the war."

Q Where were you during the Polish campaign?

A I was Commander in Chief of Army Group C and was defending the Western frontier.

Q Was the western front occupied very strongly?

A No, it was occupied weakly.

Q The Prosecution, on the 4th of January, stated that after the Polish campaign, the German officers thought of nothing but a war to capture the entire European Continent, and the Prosecution furthermore claims that the

H0974 - 0050

Generals approved of these intents of Hitler. Are these statements true?

A Just the opposite is true. My force in the West as I have already stated was verywak. The West wall had not been completed and in the Eiffel area it was just beginning. The Western powers without a doubt know of the weak west wall and of its weak occupation, but anyhow they did not attack. They waited for the advantageous moment, either they were not ready yet, but that is not probable, or they did not want to attack, or not at that time anyhow for some reason. Maybe they did not want to take the task upon themselves, or maybe we were supposed to bang our bloody heads against the Maginot line. Concerning all of those thoughts I sent a very large memo to the Commander in Chief of the Army. I proposed not to have an attack in the West. I proposed that only so many divisions from the East be transferred to the West so that the west wall could be defended against any attack. I proposed then to deactivate all other divisions. I proposed the end that this measure would become known to the western powers, and in this way they were supposed to be informed that we did not intend to capture them and I had hoped that a diplomatic attempt would be successful to bring about a closer relationship or a betterment of the matter.
I had the same notice due to the continuous movements of the date of attack. I did my best. In other words, I did not attempt to bring about an aggressive war against France but I attempted to prevent it. I am sorry but all of these hopes were only superficial. Hitler wrote during November various strong protests to the Commander in Chief concerning their weaknesses and told them ofhis distrust.

Q What was yourpositionduring the Russian campaign?

A I was Commander in Chief of the Army Group North.

Q What was your participation in the preparation of this attack?

A In the course of this work, I believe it was about in March, we were called to Hitler and there informed of the following in long statements:

"The idea is that Russia will attack us very certainly and we have, in order for security, to go ahead of this attack."

In other words, a preventive war has to be. I still don't know today whether these statements by Hitler at the time were true or were lies.

H0974-0051

Q Did you after marching into Russia find out there were small forces there?

A At my point there was a strong power of forces.

Q Did you see a lot of new airports?

A I cannot say that specifically.

Q Did you not speak later on to a Russian army chief concerning this march?

A A higher Russian officer told me, he claimed he was Commander in Chief of an Army, told me that before my sector four large armies were supposed to be, and of these, that all were there at the time with the exception of one Siberian army which was still in transport. These statements proved only what I had already seen from my actual contact.

H0974-0052

Q Did you before the start of the Russian campaign have any possibility or any chance to show them or hamper the idea or order or Hitler to attack Russia?

A There was no possibility to hamper the orders of Hilter. It was impossible to point out the difficulty of an attack campaign in the wide spaces of Russia. It was impossible to point out the dangers of a two-front war. Exactly, that for the German National Socialist State was the biggest fault of the Kaiser Reich or the Kaiser that we should not have a two front war started.

Q When did you leave the active service again after this?

A January, 1942/

Q Were you retired?

A No, I asked for my retirement.

Q And why?

A Because of the development which the National Socialist System took, first in a political manner, the prosecution of the churches, secondly, and the foreign political policy, thirdly, and for personal reasons because I myself, and my wife were being watched and guarded and spied on, and, fourthly, for international right in preventing a situation because of the commissar, and fifth, one of the main points was the continuous false orders or decisions, which, without any reasons, caused a lot of bloodshed which was avoidable. I saw no further possibility to influence the autocratic decisions of Hitler and the operations of Hitler and that is why I resigned.

Q Was there at that time already a law according to which military leaders were unable, if they did not agree to military orders or for some other reason wished to leave the service?

A So far as I know, no. However, the agreement of Hitler was necessary, because otherwise it would have been desertion or a breaking of the oath unless Hitler agreed.

Q In other words, against the will of Hitler you could not have done that?

A Hardly.

H0974-0053

Q What did you do after you were released?

A After retirement I returned to Munich and continued my study of the Archives and finished the history of my family. I was completely in the background. That took three and a half years and then there was the rest of it.

Q When did you move and by whom were you moved?

A By American soldiers. After my arrest my personal memoirs were burned and plundered and destroyed and I am sorry but among them were many valuable documentswhich had been given to me for safekeeping by the Bararian archives.

Q The prosecution claims that the military leaders had planned concerning certain crimes of war. Is that true?

A We did not have any mutual plan. Our entire education was training and tradition, and besides that we guarded well most of these rules of warfare and we asked the same things from our soldiers, the honor of the enemy and the honor of proclamation honoring the rules of warfare.

Q Did you as Commander in Chief of an army group have the power of a court?

A No.

Q Was this power with the armies?

A With the armies and with the lower positions.

Q Could you find out how these courts were handled by the armies under your command?

A I could ask that a transcript of the report be given to me but I believe that I got a much better indication of discipline by the front troops, by regular, frequent front inspections, and you would get a much better impression through them than through single acts or files.

Q When would you say for the first time that Hitler did not respect the international rules of war?

A That was in an already mentioned speech in the spring of 1941. At that timme he said that the right warfare was not the right thing for the Russian campaign and that the political commissars were not considered soldiery.

Q What did you do thereupon?

H0974-0054

A I, with various other generals, went to the Commander in Chief of the Army and protested against this. The Commander in Chief of the Army made assuring statements.

Q After that an order wasissued that the commissars are to be shot and a second order was attached to it according to which soldiers were not supposed to be disciplined in crimes against thepopulation. What did you do now?

A One further order came out at the same time and that is when the Commanders in Chief of the Army required the sharpest discipline, and that left the importance or destroyed the importance of the other two orders. We understood what the Commander in Chief wanted through his order. I myself, that is, the army group command post, only received this order later, since this army group headquarters, as stated already, did not have any courts.

Q Did you agree with the army directive?

A At that time I had the 50th Army Corps and that corps did not receive the decree. I stated time and time again that I considered that decree unlawful.

Q Did you through your front inspections - could you see whether the lower commanders were of the same opinion?

A I noticed that very often. At that time about eight or nine commanding generals were under my command. Of these generals, I met four here in prison, in various prisons, that is. I asked the opinion at various times concerning this decree and these four commanding generals told me the following, either they did not receive the decree at all, or they did not pass it on, or they saw to it that it was not carried out. Besides, the fact was that the troops did not take the time mostly to find the political commissars and had quite often taken their own men, and therefore, this decree, without much noise about it, was quietly sabotaged.

Q Who are the Commanding Generals that you met while in prison? Who are these generals who stated that they either did not receive the order or did not passit on or passed it on to the individual commanders with the order not to carry it out?

H0974-0055

A Lieutenant General Von Boot, Commander of the first armored corps; Lieutenant General Lindema, Commander in Chief of the 50th Armored Corps; Lieutenant General Reinhart, Commander of the 41st Armored coprs; and Lieutenant General Von Mannstein, Commander in Chief of the 56th Armored Corps.

Q Do you know these accused Commanders in Chief who were of the same opinion concerning this order as you?

A Yes, I believe I know them all. I know at least that those that were in my scope of orders, they were of the same opinion.

Q Did the 18th army belong to your area?

A Yes.

Q And who was your commanding general there?

A Colonel General Von Kueckler.

Q Did you ever discuss the commissar order with him?

A I canot say thatunder oath whether or not I did that, but it is possible.

Q Did you consider the commissar order advantageous to war fare?

A I considered this decree as a big mistake because it brought the sharpest resistance from the p"i tical commissars and these forces brought their troops to the highest resistance and the greatest resistance. One should have done the opposite. We should have burned our own bridges to thepolitical commissars.

Q Why did the Commanders in Chief not mutually get together and ask thatthese orders be rescinded?

A We were not a groupp, first of all. Secondly, I amafraid that Hitler would have considered us as mutineers, but at least not able to carry out this war against Russia. Maybe the situation would have been favorable to remove all unwanted Commanders in Chief and resort to re-pleacemant through irresponsible men. Then the opposite would have happened from what we wanted. The order probably would hot have been rescinded, and it probably would have been made more powerful. The only possible way out of this difficult situation was to quietly sabotage it, and that is what happened.

Q Was the order rescinded later on, do you know?

A That was after my time.

H0974-0056

Q Do you know anything concerning the Einsatzgruppe A in the area of the army group North?

A I never did hear of any task of Einsatzgruppe A which were against the Reich rules of war.

Q The prosecution has presented a sworn document of SS Fuehrer Schellenberg, USA 557, in which Schellenberg states the following. I quote:

I want to quote the entire thing so that the entire thing can be translated.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: How long is it?

INTERPRETER: About eight lines.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: Go ahead.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q "The aforementioned close cooperation or rather the first weeks of Russian campaign, the close work between the field army and the Einsatzgruppe makes me express my opinion that the Commanding Chiefs of the army groups and of the armies which were opposed to participation in the Russian campaign, already now changes the beginning of this campaign, and the large future duties of the Einsatzgruppe and Einsatzgruppen Commanders and the Security Police, and the SD, up to the mass extermination of the Jews collapsed, and all other resistance elements through the regular channels of the Commander in Chief of the army, that they were informed of this."

Witness were you informed of these goals and intentions before the beginning of the campaign?

A No.

(A short recess is taken)

H0974-0057

(THE COMMISSION RECONVENED AT 1545 HOURS.)

BY DR. LATERNSER :

Q I refer to the same affidavit referred to the in the previous question in this, my next question. In this Document, it says that in the beginning of June, 1943 a conference took place between Schellenberg and the chief operations officer of the army, together with Wagner, Heydrick and Kanaris in the presence of all the 1-C officers of all the army and army groups concerning the Einsatzkommandos. In this connection, Schellenberg makes the following claim, which I quote : "In my case, one can hardly doubt that these 1-C officers has informed all their Commanders-in-Chief of all army and army groups who had returned after the action against Russia." I should like to ask you if your 1-C officer reported to you or informed you of such information ?

A I don't remember the slightest thing about this.

Q While you were in the east did you ever receive a report, according to which Lithuanians were supposed to have carried out a massacre on the Jewish population of Kovno ?

A I received the affidavit of an officer of my staff and this General stated under oath. An officer of my staff went to Kovno and there he learned of a terrible massacre carried on the Jewish population at Kovno. He reported this matter to me and thereupon I issued the strictest instructions that these measures against the Jews in Kovno by the Lithuanians was to cease immediately. That is what this General states under oath. Then, we later ourselves advance on Kovno. He convinced himself that the city commandant carried out the orders in the strictest terms. The remarkable thing concerning this affidavit is that Lithuanians are the ones who carried out this Jewish persecution. That is to say Einsatzgruppe did not appear.

Q I shall submit this affidavit later.

The witness, Uhlendorff, who has been interrogated here said that Hitler or Himmler spoke to all the commanders in chiefs before the Russian campaign about the persecution of the Jews, did you take part in any such conference or were you present at any such address or lecture ?

A Witness Uhlendorff is just as much mistaken as Wittness Schellenberg. We were not so informed.

Q At which time did the Daltic countries come under the jurisdiction of the German Commandant east ?

H0974-0058

A As far as I know, by the decree proclaimed by Hitler on 17 June 1941.

Q The prosecution has maintained that the German troops destroyed over 2,000 chapels and churches in Russia. Could you make such an observation while you were on Soviet-Russian territory ?

A I did not see any churches which were destroyed. On the other hand, I also saw no church which served its original purpose.

Q I should now like to ask you some questions concerning Leningrad. You proposed to Keitel on one of his visits to you that the Russian population should be transferred to Russian territory by means of a corridor that should be established south of Schlusselburg. In what relation did your suggestion to Keitel stand ?

A The position was the following : Leningrad had been encircled in the north by the Finns and in the south by my troops. There was only a connection to the inner part of Russia left across the Ladoga sea. A reconnaissance showed that shipping on the Ingermann land lake was not sufficient to supply Leningrad. The intelligence received from agents concerning the food situation in Leningrad was contradictory. This information varied between several weeks and several months, therefore, I was agraid that one day food would be so scarce in Leningrad that the population would leave the city in entire groups. Because of this fear, I proposed to negotiate with the Russians and to get them to agree that the population of Leningrad should be transferred to the Russian territory in an orderly fashion.

Q Then your concern was so that the population of Leningrad should not starve, is that it ?

A At that time, we estimated Leningrad to have a population of from one and one quarter to one and one half million people and the supply condition on our side for this more than a million population was the following : I could have housed and fed a few hundred or thousands of the population of Leningrad in Ingermannland which is west of Leningrad and in Esthonia. We did not take any food supplies away from the population and it may have been possible to have the population tied over as far as food was concerned until the next harvest. South of Leningrad there is an immence girdle of forest and swamp. No essential number of people could be housed there. That means the mass of the population would have fallen into my lot to feed and that was impossible. The supply system was so tense at that time that I had difficult

H0974-0059

at that time in supplying my own troops and it was not possible to supply an additional million of the population of Leningrad. It was also not possible to remove them by train for the conditions as far as transportation were concerned was such that we were just able to meet our own requirements. For these reasons, I made the proposal that has been mentioned.

H0974-0060

Q Were any agreements reached with the Russians?

A No such agreements were arrived at because the population did not begin to leave the city and the situation had not become a pressing one as yet. Because of the combat positions an agreement probably could not be reached as just where we wanted to have the population evacuated heavy battles were going on at the lower Wolchov and in the direction of Tuglin. Then the river froze over and the Russians built a railway across at a tremendous and surprise speed. I cannot say, under oath, whether a second Railroad line was built or not. This is how I remember it and for another thing the population did not leave Leningrad at least not in large numbers at any rate. In this way, the entire affair receded in the background. I was then able to assume that sufficient supplies were still at hand or had been brought up. I left the section in January of 1942.

Q I have a few more questions concerning the shelling of Leningrad by artillery fire. Do you know what objectives were shelled by the German artillery stationed before Leningrad?

A First of all, I should like to say that at the time I was in command no shelling of Leningrad took place in the sense of an artillery bombardment. Insofar as our munitions were concerned, the situation was very tense, therefore only the most necessary objectives could be shot at or shelled in the Leningrad sector. I needed my heavy munitions in the battle area of Denianzand Wolchov. The objectives which we shelled were military objectives and I would like to name the tank works at Piorow which manufactured the heavy Russian tanks -- the tanks that were produced left the works and fired at our ranks and this organization was one of the objectives which we shelled.

We shelled the steel works Ischavosky. I assumed that munitions were being manufactured there. We shelled the dock and harbor installations and the Leningrad Harbor at the mouth of the Neva where it closed into the Finnish Bay. Evidently submarines were being built there. We shelled the iron works at Marva as they shot at our lines with heavy ship artillery.

Q A witness has been interrogated here who believed he was in a position to testify that the castles in and around Leningrad were shelled on purpose.

A Of course, my testimony can only confine itself up to January, 1942.

H0974-0061

I consider it impossible at this time that castles were systematically shelled as we lacked artillery and munitions for this.

Q Did you find during your advance on Soviet Russian territory that Russian troops carried out great devastations in Russian territory?

A The Russian troops knew how to destroy their railroad lines very skillfully. I don't believethat any railroad station of any importance fell into our hands undestroyed. One thing that caused us very much trouble was the destruction of water supply stations for locomotives. Much time had to be spen in order to put the railway lines in a half way decent condition. Again, the rails too had to be changed from the larger Russian gauge to the smaller German gauge. Numerous street bridges had also been destroyed. The result was that I had to postpone my advance between the Ilmen Lake and Lake Peipus another eight or ten days. I had to stop and wait until the lines had been repaired.

Q No further questions.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY DR. KEMPNER:

Q Did you receive your officer's training at the German War Academy?

A Yes.

Q When did you receive your training with the General Staff in Berlin?

A From 1909 to 1911.

Q Did you keep up your contact with other comrades of the General Staff or did you have no touch with them later on?

A In 1911 I returned to Bavaria.

Q Were you a member later of the Schlieffen organization?

A I believe every general staff officershad to be a member of this organization.

Q Did you receive the material and pamphlets of this organization?

A I received the lists of members and statements of accounts, etc.

Q This organization was a very respected one, was it not?

A I believe so.

Q And had a very good name, as the best officers' organization?

A I believe this statement can be answered in the affirmative.

Q The majority of these gentlemen received higher positions later on --

H0974-0062

that is to say they turned out to be something, is that correct?

A To a certain extent that is undoubtedly correct for the best people were accepted in the general staff.

Q Would it be correct to say that these gentlemen really understood the military theory?

A The training that was received there was a general staff technical

H0974-0063

staff training. For instance, how to cope with railroad transports, etc., large troop movements and how to lead a battle.

Q Strategy?

A Yes.

Q Operational Training and Tactics?

A Yes.

Q Military law and history of war?

A Yes, as far as martial law is concerned. I am not quite sure about the Prussian staff, although in Bavaria, yes.

Q Did you receive the order?

A Yes.

Q Did you know what Moltke and Schlieffen say about the order? They said: "Higher than the order is my conscience and my duty to my fatherland."

A I don't remember this passage, but it is probably so.

Q Do you agree with this statement because you retired in 1942?

A I gave proof of this bt my own person.

Q From which year onward were you suspicious of Hitler, the affair of Hitler and his party?

A I must say here that my time was so taken up with military things, I could not take my time up with political matters and also we were not allowed to do so, however, at any rate one had ones thoughts about these things. If you would like to know the date of the year, I would say that beginning with the year of 1933 I began to mistrust them or at least I began to take a waiting position as to what they would do. I do not know for certain, but I would say in 1933.

Q Where were you in 1933?

A I was Chief of Service Command 2 in Stettin.

Q Did you interest yourself in the Hitler Putsche in Munich?

A As the army chief for Bavaria, of course it would be of interest to me.

Q Do you know that Hitler broke his word of honor at that time toward the Generals Lossen and Kahr?

H0974-0064

A That is the presentation that is given that he broke his word.

Q Did you have your suspicions of the whole affair already at that time and did your suspicions increase up to 1933?

A I did not like the bragging ttitude from the very beginning.

Q Where were you in 1933 when Hitler came to power?

A I was commander in Bavaria.

Q Did you live in Munich?

A Yes.

Q Is it correct that you were in Munich in February and March of 1933?

A Yes.

Q Do you remember the large election posters that had been put up in Munich, "Hitler means War!"

A No. You mean they must have been posted by the opposing party.

Q Yes, by the Bavarian people's party and the Social Democratic party. Do you remember the phrase brought up by the people at that time? "Hitler Means War - He Who Elects Hitler Votes For War."

H0974-0065

A I cannot testify under oath that I remember these things.

Q You rejected Hitler's theories, is that correct?

A No, it is not correct as you state it. I knew the main points of his program and if one reads these points quite carefully, there are many points that one might agree with, but a large part of these points of his program were reversed into the opposite.

Q Did you approve of his racial theory?

A That was one of the big foolish things that were done.

Q What about the Lebensraum or living space theory?

A What do you mean?

Q Germany did not have sufficient living space?

A That was a political slogan.

Q Germany must have territory in the east in order to live?

A I had not possibility of judging if this was right or wrong. I considered this one of the many political slogans.

Q Was it your personal opinion that Germany had sufficient living space?

A We had been able to live since the existance of the Reich since 1871 until 1933. I suppose that it was also possible for the future.

Q You answered to one of Dr. Laternser's questions that you had hoped that the Polish campaign would also be carried out without any blood-shed the same as the Sudetenland campaign.

A A silent hope.

Q Would it be correct to say that you meant that you had hoped that Hitler would have a certain success wi th this Polish campaign, but

H0974-0066

that it would be carried out without bloodshed.

A I hoped that without any bloodshed and without any warfare the affair might lead to a diplomatic and agreeable agreement.

Q But, on August 22nd Hitler did not mention anything of an agreement to you, did he?

A No, I don't believe so.

Q He said that more or less Poland would have to disappear.

A I don't remember in detail his statements. He said very much. I don't know whether you ever heard Hitler speak, he always bragged very much and one should not always take him very seriously

Q Do you mean to say that you do not think he meant to have Poland disappear?

A No. On the contrary I must testified that he hoped and wished a peaceful settlement would be brought about.

Q In the same manner as the snake eats the rabbit. Is that the idea?

A No, that was not my idea, but a peaceful agreement similar to what happened at Munich before the march of Hitler into the Sudetenland - that the diplomats would come together and confer.

Q There the Sudetenland also disappeared?

A With the agreement of the western powers.

Q And by blackmail.

A I don't know, I did not take part in these meetings.

Q Did Hitler not say on August 22nd that conflict with Poland would happen sooner or later?

A I really don't remember what he said in detail.

Q A number of gentlemen were assembled, is that true?

A Yes.

Q How many of your old comrades were present?

A What do you mean by old comrades?

Q The gentlemen of the leadership group whom you had known for many years?

A The Commanders in Chief? I probably knew all of them - some of them a long time and some for a shorter time.

H0974-0067

Q Will you please mention the names of those whom you remember?

A Those who were present?

Q Yes.

A I don't remember the individual ones. I can mention all the names as I remember, or the offices that had been assembled Von Runstedt, Witzleben, Boch, Reicheman and List. I must say that I am under oath and I do not remember if Commander in Chief 4 was Reicheman at that time, but I believe he was. You must remember that I had retired at that time and was no longer interested in the military affairs. I did quite different things at that time.

Q I should like to ask an intermediate question at this time. If you had no more interest in these things at that time and you were then already 62 years of age, why did you put your services at the disposal of an adventurer against whom you had certain convictions?

A Are you speaking from the viewpoint of the present time? At that time it was not quite so evident that Hitler was an adventurer. Moreover, if the call comes to me and asks me to place my services at the disposal of my country in hard times and I still feel healthy, I considered it my duty not to let my country down. The motives may have been a personal ambition or so on.

Q But, you are a man with critical powers of observation and knew that your country was not in danger?

A I was not able to judge.

Q You knew that Poland was in danger of being swallowed by this snake?

A I already testified that I hoped for a peaceful settlement.

Q Did you know of Hitler's racial theories?

A I probably read of them in the newspaper. If it was reported in the newspaper, I must have known of it.

Q You considered it your duty to participate in 1939 for reasons?

H0974-0068

A Yes.

Q I would like to advance a few years. Now there was another such strange meeting and this meeting took place before the so-called Russian campaign. Do you know that the prosecution submitted a Document of the General Staff. I shall quote the PS Number a little later. This reads as follows: Dated - Spring, 1941. "We have to attack Russia, otherwise we will not be able to stand another winter of war. We must conquer these additional territories because we will have to feed Germany from these newly conquered territories."

Assuming that is correct, would you say today that the Russian War was a preventive war?

A What you just mentioned does not mean the reason or motive for a preventive war. The preventive war is based on the statement of Hitler, saying that Russia was going to attack us in any case.

Q What gentlemen were asked to appear in the Reichs Chancellory in

H0974-0069

Berling at that time to report on the Barbarossa Plan?

A. The Barbarossa Plan refers to the Russian campaign. I assume the commanders in chief, also the commanders of the Armies.

Q. Would you say von Rundstedt was there?

A. Yes.

Q. Was von Reichlman present?

A. Yes. I can mention: Myself, Kuchlen; of No.4 Hopne, who was hanged, and Bush of the 16th. I must add that I blieve they were present, as I repeat I am under oath.

Q. Yes, we are quite agreed to the fact that everything here is according to your knowledge and conscience. If you do not remember, you cannot say.

A. Yes.

Q. At that time you reported to Hitler and told him how you thought the operation in the north was going to be carried out?

A. I believe this report did not take place until the June meeting. There was another meeting at that time. If I remember correctly, the army group commands had to report separately. I did not learn what the other army groups had reported.

Q. Then there was the meeting where the orders were issued, that was at the end of March. As I picture things, it was quite an enormous affair, was it not?

A. Yes.

A. Was it not like a concert where very one had to be tuned to everyone else?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time mention was made of the enormous cog wheel organization of the military machine where everything had to pump from everything glose?

A. That does not apply to this war, but to any war.

Q. But, it was particularly evident here as there was such an enormous undertaking?

H0974-0070

A. I don't remember if more divisions were used than in the attack on the west.

Q. Now, to return to the meeting. You stated as to how your operation was to be carried out, that is correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember his reaction to this?

A. I don't think he objected or disapproved of anything. As far as I remember, he approved.

Q. And did not interfere?

A. No, at that time, thank God, not yet.

Q. Why thank God?

A. It became worse from week to week. I can speak quite open here, can't I? During the entire campaign against France where I commanded one of the three army groups, I was not interfered with by one word. I issued orders to an armored army. In the Russian campaign, the same was true in the beginning, that is in the first few weeks there was no interference. There was no interference during the operations in the Baltic countries and then, for the reasons stated previously, there was a stop because of the destruction of the railway lines and the difficulty of getting supplies. That was when it began.

Q. Hitler interfered with the people who were capable, is that correct?

A. I shall not say it of myself that I was capable, but the other gentlemen were. Yes, he interfered with them and Jodl during his interrogations once spoke of a martyrdom. Of course, I don't know if this is justifiable or not, but it was made very difficult.

Q. It was very hard because this man interfered with you, was it not?

A. He sometimes concerned himself with details which we ourselves did not know about, and we had to inform ourselves first.

Q. If action had been taken according to you gentlemen, the Generals of the General Staff and not according to Hitler,

H0974-0071

would it be correct to say the war would not have been lost?

A. War in Russia is tremendously difficult. Hitler did not realize just where the difficulties lay, and if he had followed us, the war would have ended at least in a draw or undecided.

Q. In the west, if the Generals would have been able to do what they considered correct, it might have been won?

A. I cannot judge this, because after I retired, I only learned what had taken place from the communications of the army.

CAPTAIN TUBRIDY: There will be a session tomorrow morning at ten o'clock. We will adjourn until then.

(The Commission adjourned at 1700 hours)

The foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the testimony of RITTER VON LEEB, taken on 21 June 1946.

ROSE M. COOK
Reporter (pp 1 - 23)

ALICE MEEHAN
Reporter (pp 24 - 38)

CERTIFIED TO:

JOSEPH F. TUBRIDY
Commissioner.